Chapter 3. Legal Perspectives on Acquisitions of Mediterranean Antiquities

It will be helpful for anyone involved in the acquisition of an antiquity to understand a few legal terms pertaining to ownership. In establishing a work’s provenance, a key question is whether previous owners held (and had the authority to transfer) good title to that work. Under both common and civil law regimes,⁶ good title is the maximum ownership interest in property. Good title provides the holder with complete dominion and control of the property,⁷ including the right to transfer that title by lifetime gift, sale, exchange, testamentary devise, or otherwise.⁸

Void title is the quality of title held by a thief in stolen property: it is an absence of ownership rights.⁹ An object may have what is known as a cloud on title, which is less a legal concept and more of a descriptive one referring to a possessor whose good title may be susceptible to a challenge.¹⁰

Finally, in civil law jurisdictions, a good faith (or bona fide) purchaser can obtain good title even to a stolen object. These ownership rights arise according to statute and are referred to as prescriptive title (or title by prescription).

A fundamental distinction between the civil and common law systems is the relative protection provided to theft victims and good faith purchasers. Theft victims and good faith purchasers are innocent parties. In a court of law, only one of them can prevail, and the question is how the law favors one innocent party over the other.

Under the common law doctrine of nemo dat quod non habet,¹¹ a thief cannot transfer more than what the thief has: void title. Accordingly, no one whose putative title descends from a thief can obtain good title to a stolen work. Thus, the common law nemo dat rule tips the balance in favor of theft victims as against subsequent good faith purchasers. The civil law, however, as a means of maintaining commercial certainty and the smooth functioning of markets, favors good faith purchasers. In civil law jurisdictions, good faith purchasers can acquire good title by prescription, even to stolen property, either at the time of purchase or following a relatively short period thereafter, depending on the jurisdiction. As a general rule, once title arises by prescription, rights of the theft victim to reclaim the stolen property terminate.

To determine the legal status of an antiquity under U.S. law requires the discovery of demonstrably reliable, authentic documentation as to:

(a) when, where, and under what circumstances the object was discovered;

(b) when and under what circumstances the object was exported from its country of modern discovery and from any other country through which it traveled; and

(c) when and under what circumstances the object was imported into the United States.

The significance of these factors will become apparent with the following description of applicable U.S. law. The hierarchy of U.S. law descends from constitutional law to international treaty law, federal law, state law, and local law. Rights to property generally are determined under state law unless an international treaty provision or federal statute applies. The United States is a State Party¹² to bilateral and multilateral international treaties that may affect title to an antiquity. The most important of these is the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property and its implementing statute, the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act of 1983, discussed below. Additionally, long-standing federal laws (such as the National Stolen Property Act and customs statutes) require verifiable documentation to assure that a museum can obtain good title to an antiquity, avoid potential civil or criminal liability for possessing the object, and safeguard it from civil or criminal seizure and forfeiture actions.

In 1970 the United States and Mexico signed a bilateral treaty under which each country obligated itself to assist the other in the recovery of certain kinds of stolen cultural property.¹³ The treaty did not define “stolen,” and in fact has not been instrumental in the return of cultural property from one country to the other. Nevertheless, the treaty reflects concerns that arose in the 1960s over the increasing number of well-documented examples of illicit excavation and subsequent illicit export of antiquities from “source” nations to “market” nations.¹⁴

Those concerns eventually led to the adoption of the most important, multilateral treaty addressing these issues, the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (“UNESCO 1970” or the “Convention”).¹⁵ As of 2021, 140 countries were States Parties to the Convention. Although the United States ratified the Convention in 1972, it was not until passage of the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CCPIA)¹⁶ in 1983 that the Convention had legal effect in the U.S.¹⁷ The CCPIA gave force of law in the United States to only two provisions of the Convention: Articles 7(b) and Article 9.

UNESCO 1970, Article 7(b)

Article 7(b) states, in pertinent part, as follows:

The States Parties to this Convention undertake:

[. . . .]

(b)(i) to prohibit the import of cultural property stolen from a museum or a religious or secular public monument or similar institution in another State Party to this Convention after the entry into force of this Convention for the States concerned, provided that such property is documented as appertaining to the inventory of that institution;¹⁸

(ii) at the request of the State Party of origin, to take appropriate steps to recover and return any such cultural property imported after the entry into force of this Convention in both States concerned, provided, however, that the requesting State shall pay just compensation to an innocent purchaser or to a person who has valid title to that property. Requests for recovery and return shall be made through diplomatic offices. The requesting Party shall furnish, at its expense, the documentation and other evidence necessary to establish its claim for recovery and return. The Parties shall impose no customs duties or other charges upon cultural property returned pursuant to this Article. All expenses incident to the return and delivery of the cultural property shall be borne by the requesting Party.

The CCPIA gave force of law to Article 7(b): Article 7(b)(ii) is codified in 19 U.S.C. (United States Code) § 2609 and Article 7(b)(i), as follows, in 19 U.S.C. § 2607:

§ 2607. Stolen cultural property

No article of cultural property documented as appertaining to the inventory of a museum or religious or secular public monument or similar institution in any State Party which is stolen from such institution after the effective date of this chapter, or after the date of entry into force of the Convention for the State Party, whichever date is later, may be imported into the United States.

Importantly, the CCPIA’s enactment of Article 7(b) tracks the Convention’s narrow definition of stolen cultural property, which includes only objects “appertaining to [an] inventory. . . .” Accordingly, it applies only to known, documented objects.

To comply with the CCPIA’s implementation of Article 7(b) requires determining whether the antiquity appears in the inventory of a museum, public monument, or similar institution in another State Party, and, if so, whether the original owner voluntarily transferred title to the work (for example, by deaccessioning). If the work was stolen, research must determine both the date of the theft and the date when the Convention entered into force in the other State Party.¹⁹

Implementation of Article 7(b) effected only minor changes in U.S. law. Federal customs statutes have long prohibited the importation of stolen property, subjecting them to potential seizure and forfeiture.²⁰ More importantly, theft victims—including foreign countries—have always had access to U.S. federal and state courts to seek recovery of their stolen property. What the CCPIA does achieve, however, is to allow the United States to initiate an action for return of the object, thereby obviating the need for other States Parties to sue in U.S. courts.²¹

UNESCO 1970, Article 9

As we have seen, the CCPIA’s implementation of Article 7(b) augmented, but did not significantly alter, existing rights under U.S. law. However, the CCPIA’s enactment of Article 9 effected a major change in U.S. cultural policy.²²

At least since the Civil War, the United States has promoted the essentially unrestricted importation of works of art, antiquities, and other forms of cultural property. Typically, the only requirement for legally importing such property was to make an accurate, written customs declaration upon the property’s importation.²³ By implementing Article 9 Congress created an exception to that open-door policy, an exception that the CCPIA itself refers to as a “drastic” measure.²⁴ Under provisions of the CCPIA that give force of law to Article 9, the United States may impose import restrictions on cultural property originating in other States Parties if precise statutory requirements are met. The legislation sets out two basic approaches for imposing such import restrictions.²⁵

The first, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2602, requires a request for assistance from another State Party stating that its “cultural patrimony . . . is in jeopardy from the pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials.”²⁶ If the United States determines that the request meets the CCPIA’s statutory requirements,²⁷ the U.S. may enter into an agreement (generally referred to as a “Memorandum of Understanding” or, more commonly, MOU) with the requesting State Party blocking importation into the U.S. of antiquities from the other State Party.²⁸ These agreements are effective for five years and may be extended for additional five-year periods. The second is the “emergency” or “crisis” provision in 19 U.S.C. § 2603. Following a request from another State Party, under 19 U.S.C. § 2603, the U.S. may unilaterally bar importation of cultural property from a State Party for a three-year period.

If the United States takes action under either 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602 or 2603, it must publish a “designated list” of works subject to import restrictions in the Code of Federal Regulations (commonly referred to simply as CFR.). The effect of publication of the designated list is straightforward:

No designated archaeological or ethnological material that is exported (whether or not such exportation is to the United States) from the State Party after [publication of the designated list] may be imported into the United States unless the State Party issues a certification or other documentation which certifies that such exportation was not in violation of the laws of the State Party.²⁹

Accordingly, determining if an antiquity is subject to U.S. import restrictions under 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602–2603 requires reference to current MOUs and their respective designated lists.³⁰ If an antiquity fits within the description of works on a “designated list,” it must then be determined whether the antiquity was exported from the other State Party before or after publication of the list. If before, the work is not subject to these import restrictions. However, if the antiquity was exported after publication, it cannot legally be imported into the United States without an export license from the other State Party. An antiquity imported in violation of these restrictions is subject to seizure and forfeiture.³¹ It is not enough to document the country from which the object was exported immediately prior to entry into the U.S.: these restrictions apply to works exported from the other State Party after publication of the designated list even if the object passed through other countries prior to importation into the U.S.

Customs Laws

U.S. federal law has long prohibited the importation of goods “contrary to law” and provides for any such goods to be seized and forfeited.³² Accordingly, verifiable documentation of an antiquity’s importation into the United States is essential for determining its legal status in the U.S. An object is imported contrary to law if the work is stolen,³³ violates an import restriction under the CCPIA or other cultural property import restriction,³⁴ is not declared at the border,³⁵ or is declared with information that misstates the object’s fair market value or country of origin.³⁶ Accordingly, in addition to authenticating an antiquity’s U.S. Customs Declaration form, an assessment is required to determine if the form accurately stated the work’s fair market value and its country of origin. That determination requires reference to verifiable documentation such as bills of sale, invoices, deeds of gift, correspondence, shipment records, insurance policies, and the like.

The National Stolen Property Act

The National Stolen Property Act³⁷ (NSPA) has a long, colorful history. In the early twentieth century, automobiles became the target of theft and a means of escape. So long as thieves could outrun police in the state where the theft occurred and reach a neighboring state, they could avoid immediate consequences: the jurisdiction of state police did not extend beyond a state’s border. Congress took note and in 1919 enacted the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act making such thefts federal crimes. Since federal prosecutors are not limited by state boundaries, a run for the border no longer provided a safe haven for car thieves. In 1934 Congress extended the act to cover other kinds of stolen property and renamed it the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA). Today, NSPA violations can lead to civil or criminal liability for individuals (or institutions) and to civil or criminal seizure and forfeiture actions against the stolen property.

The two operative provisions of the NSPA are set out in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2315, which state in pertinent part:

§ 2314. Transportation of stolen goods [. . .] Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, merchandise . . . of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud . . . Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. . . .

§ 2315. Sale or receipt of stolen goods [. . .] Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any goods, wares, or merchandise . . . of the value of $5,000 or more . . . which have crossed a State or United States boundary after being stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken, knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken . . . Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. . . .

Additionally, violation of the NSPA subjects the stolen goods to seizure and forfeiture.³⁸

Notice that the NSPA includes what the law calls a “scienter” requirement: a person cannot be held liable under the NSPA absent knowledge that the goods were stolen. However, in the context of antiquities, at least one federal Circuit Court of Appeals has held that conscious avoidance of information that would reveal whether the work is stolen constitutes actual knowledge sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement.³⁹ Notice, too, that possession of property that is known to be stolen, valued at more than $5,000, and has “crossed a State or United States boundary” violates 18 U.S.C. § 2315. Because possession is a continuing crime, arguably no statute of limitations is available as a defense: each moment of possession constitutes a new violation.

The NSPA applies to a much broader category of stolen property than the CCPIA, which is limited to inventoried works stolen from a “museum, or religious or secular public monument or similar institution.”⁴⁰ The NSPA applies to any stolen goods within its statutory language. Moreover, courts applying the NSPA have interpreted the word “stolen” broadly.⁴¹

Foreign Countries’ Laws and the U.S. National Stolen Property Act

Starting in the nineteenth century and with increased frequency following World War II, antiquities-rich countries enacted what are generally referred to as patrimony statutes. These laws typically address three issues: requirements for archaeological excavations, ownership of and trade in antiquities, and exportation of antiquities and other cultural property.

Most patrimony statutes nationalize—that is, declare the country to be the owner of—antiquities located within the country’s borders. These vesting statutes generally permit continued private ownership of antiquities that were privately owned prior to their enactment but require owners to register those objects with a governmental agency. A major goal of vesting statutes is to vest title to unknown—that is, unearthed—antiquities to deter the looting of archaeological sites and the resulting destruction of the site’s archaeological record. Vesting statutes create property rights: the nation becomes the legal owner of antiquities within their ambit.

Export laws, on the other hand, are regulatory: they do not create property rights but merely describe the circumstances under which an object may lawfully be exported. Export laws range (either at law or in effect) from near complete bans on the export of antiquities to schemes allowing some antiquities (typically those of lesser importance) to be granted an export permit and, thus, be exported lawfully. It is a general rule of international law that the regulatory laws of one country are not enforceable in another country absent a treaty obligation to the contrary.⁴² Thus, violations of a country’s export laws are generally actionable only in that country. Property rights differ: a theft victim (whether an individual, institution, or country) generally can sue to recover stolen property wherever that property is discovered.

The question then arises whether illegal export of an antiquity from a country that has enacted a vesting statute constitutes theft. In 1977 a federal Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed that question. In the landmark case, United States v. McClain, a federal judge began his opinion with this remarkable sentence: “Museum directors, art dealers, and innumerable private collectors throughout this country must have been in a state of shock when they read the news—if they did—of the convictions of the five defendants in this case.”⁴³ The shock derived from the U.S. government’s novel application of the NSPA.

The case involved recently looted (and therefore unprovenanced), pre-Columbian antiquities exported from Mexico without an export license. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination that illicit export of the antiquities after Mexico had enacted legislation nationalizing them permitted the antiquities to be characterized as stolen within the meaning of the NSPA.⁴⁴ A later opinion in the long history of the case summarized what has come to be known as the “McClain Doctrine”:

The legal theory under which the case was tried was that the artifacts were “stolen” only in the sense that Mexico generally has declared itself owner of all pre-Columbian artifacts found within its borders. Thus, anyone who digs up or finds such an item and deals in it without governmental permission has unlawfully converted the item from its proper owner.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, the convictions under the NSPA were reversed on grounds that the Mexican law (prior to 1972) had not expressed Mexico’s ownership “with sufficient clarity to survive translation into terms understandable by and binding upon American citizens.”⁴⁶ The court did not address how clear a foreign vesting statute must be to be “understandable by and binding upon” U.S. citizens. Twenty years later in a case involving important Egyptian antiquities, United States v. Schultz, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ratified the basic McClain Doctrine with an important modification.⁴⁷

Frederick Schultz, a New York–based antiquities dealer, was convicted of violating the National Stolen Property Act for importing Egyptian antiquities in violation of Egypt’s partrimony statute that, inter alia, vested title to the antiquities in the nation. The Schultz court found that Egypt’s vesting statute was “clear and unambiguous, and that the antiquities that were the subject of the conspiracy in [this] case were owned by the Egyptian government.”⁴⁸ But the court added a new requirement to the McClain Doctrine: the foreign country must assert actual ownership over the antiquities that its vesting statute nationalizes. Put another way, the Schultz court found that a mere declaration of national ownership, even if clear, was insufficient: there must also be evidence that the foreign country makes efforts to assert its property rights in those antiquities.⁴⁹ The court had no difficulty finding that Egypt met that requirement. The court noted that Egypt enforced its patrimony statute domestically, primarily through a specialized antiquities police force.

What then does the McClain Doctrine (as modified by Schultz) mean for provenance purposes? A great deal. It requires:

• determining when and in which country an antiquity was discovered in modern times;

• identifying the laws of that country in effect when the antiquity was discovered and when it was exported;

• if at the time of discovery the country had nationalized antiquities (that is, had enacted a vesting statute), assessing how clearly the declaration of national ownership is expressed and whether the law has exceptions;

• assessing whether that country has enforced its antiquities laws within its own borders; and

• obtaining verifiable documentation showing the antiquity was either legally exported from that country or exported prior to enactment of the applicable vesting statute.

Failure to ascertain any of these factors means that the antiquity is potentially subject to seizure and forfeiture and that its possessor is at risk of civil and criminal liability under the NSPA.

Unfortunately, each of these factors poses significant research challenges: typically, it is difficult (if not impossible) to determine where and when an unprovenanced antiquity was discovered.⁵⁰ Recall that at its height in the early second century CE, the Roman Empire covered territory that today comprises part or all of nearly fifty countries. There is no easily accessible, comprehensive database of foreign countries’ patrimony statutes, and the laws themselves are often available only in their original language.⁵¹ Translation can be time consuming and expensive, and interpretation of the law may require an opinion of an attorney in that country. Determining a foreign country’s domestic enforcement of its antiquities laws (i.e., that country’s assertion of actual ownership) is a subjective analysis. Finally, an export license, if there is one, must be carefully scrutinized to assure that it is authentic and applies to the antiquity under consideration.

Satisfying the law does not equate to ethical behavior. As a pioneer in the field of museum law put it: “The law is not designed to make us honorable, only bearable.”⁵² Legal compliance avoids the possibility of criminal or civil liability but falls short of adhering to the higher standards established in professional codes of ethics and in statements of best practices. The American Alliance of Museums (AAM)⁵³ and the Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD)⁵⁴ address the unique issues raised by the acquisition of antiquities in their respective statements of professional practices.

In July 2008 the AAM board of directors approved as a component of its Core Standards the following guidelines regarding acquisitions of archaeological material and ancient art:

Museums should:

• rigorously research the provenance of an object prior to acquisition;

• make a concerted effort to obtain accurate written documentation with respect to the history of the object, including export and import documents; and

• require sellers, donors, and their representatives to provide all available information and documentation.

Museums must comply with all applicable U.S. law, including treaties and international conventions of which the U.S. is a party, governing ownership and title, import and other issues critical to acquisitions decisions.

Beyond the requirements of U.S. law, museums should not acquire any object that, to the knowledge of the museum, has been illegally exported from its country of modern discovery or the country where it was last legally owned.

In addition, the Alliance recommends that museums require documentation that the object was out of its probable country of modern discovery by November 17, 1970.⁵⁵

[. . . .]

For objects exported from their country of modern discovery after November 17, 1970, the Alliance recommends that museums require documentation that the object has been or will be legally exported from its country of modern discovery, and legally imported into the United States.

The Alliance recognizes that there are cases in which it may be in the public’s interest for a museum to acquire an object, thus bringing it into the public domain, when there is substantial but not full documentation that the provenance meets the conditions outlined above. If a museum accepts material in such cases, it should be transparent about why this is an appropriate decision in alignment with the institution’s collections policy and applicable ethical codes.⁵⁶

To comply with AAM’s guidelines, one of three conditions must be met:

1. There is documentation that the object was out of its probable country of modern discovery by November 17, 1970; or

2. If the object was exported after that date, there is documentation that the object was or will be legally exported from its country of modern discovery and legally imported into the United States; or

3. In the absence of full documentation, there should be “substantial” documentation satisfying one of those two requirements and, in such situations, the museum should be transparent in explaining the circumstances of its decision to acquire the object.

AAMD provides the following guidance for acquiring archaeological material and ancient art:⁵⁷

5. Member museums normally should not acquire a Work unless provenance research substantiates that the Work was outside its country of probable modern discovery before 1970 or was legally exported from its probable country of modern discovery after 1970.
6. The AAMD recognizes that even after the most extensive research, many Works will lack a complete documented ownership history. Member museums may acquire such Works if:
   1. Based on the results of provenance research, the museum can make an informed judgment that the Work was outside its probable country of modern discovery before 1970 or legally exported from its probable country of modern discovery after 1970, or
   2. The cumulative facts and circumstances known to the museum after compliance with [guidelines omitted here] allow it to make an informed judgment to acquire the Work, consistent with the Statement of Principles above.

To comply with AAMD’s guidelines, one of the following conditions must be met:

1. There is documentation that the object was:

   • outside its country of probable modern discovery by November 17, 1970, or

   • legally exported from that country after 1970; or

2. Based on provenance research, the museum can make an informed judgment that the work met the first requirement; or

3. Based on facts and circumstances the museum can make an informed judgement that its acquisition is consistent with AAMD’s Statement of Principles.

The effect of AAM’s and AAMD’s guidelines leads inevitably to a simple question: if an antiquity’s only verifiable provenance is its appearance in the market, how can the work meet AAM’s “substantial documentation” requirement or AAMD’s “informed judgement” standard? In short, as a matter of law, ethics, and best practices, a work about which nothing more is known than its availability in the marketplace should not be acquired until additional, credible information is discovered.⁵⁸

The challenge for U.S. museums that acquire antiquities⁵⁹ is to chart a course consistent with legal and ethical requirements while fulfilling their educational mission to preserve, study, and present humanity’s shared cultural heritage for public benefit.

To meet that challenge, due diligence is essential, meaning museums must take reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure they are acting responsibly in acquiring an antiquity. Due diligence is a flexible concept, but, at a minimum, it requires a thorough, candid examination and investigation of known facts about the work’s provenance prior to acquiring it. Written documentation of all efforts undertaken and information derived from those efforts comprises an important component of diligence. This inquiry should be guided by standards promulgated by professional organizations (such as AAM and AAMD) and by clear, written acquisition policies adopted (and regularly reviewed) by the museum’s governing board.

Although U.S. museums generally follow the AAM and AAMD guidelines described above, some build in additional safeguards. For example, the J. Paul Getty Museum insists that all proposed acquisitions of ancient art and archaeological material—irrespective of financial value—be reviewed for compliance with the museum’s Collection Policy and disclosed to the Board of Trustees prior to acquisition.⁶⁰ In practice, this policy means that curators proposing an acquisition (by purchase, gift, or devise) must demonstrate that the object satisfies a high evidentiary standard. The written acquisition proposal must include all known information about where the object originated in antiquity, where it was discovered in modern times or whether it is documented in a collection that may be decades (or centuries) old, and its ownership history since at least 1970.

Museums and their professional organizations generally have adopted 1970 as a convenient rule of thumb in their acquisitions policies and codes of ethics, respectively.⁶¹ Thus, although 1970 has no direct legal significance, it has become a generally accepted standard not only for analyzing the risk of a potential acquisition but also as an ethical bright line. Countries and law enforcement agencies, can, and sometimes do, assert ownership of objects in circulation before 1970,⁶² but generally devote their energy to materials that have appeared in the market more recently.

As considered by Barr and Budrovich in chapter 2 of this volume, many kinds of evidence can document an object’s pre-1970 whereabouts. Examples include an entry in an auction catalogue, a dealer’s receipt for the work, or an exhibition checklist or catalogue indicating that the object was publicly exhibited. Photographs or descriptions with specific dimensions can also help to establish that the object was documented prior to 1970. Other evidence might be potentially useful, for example, mention of the work in a previous owner’s will, an appraisal report, or an inventory of a business or private collection. Import or export records have great probative value. Less formal information, such as a dealer’s business records or an individual’s correspondence or diary entries can also be helpful.

The reliability of the evidence is crucial, and determining the authenticity and credibility of documentary material is essential. Hard questions must be asked: Who is the purported author? Under what circumstances was the document created? Did the author (or the person offering the documentation) have an interest, financial or otherwise, in the object? Where has the document been since its purported creation, and how and why has it come to light? Obviously, a letter found through scholarly research in an established archive is more credible than one proffered by a would-be seller without clear indication of the letter’s chain of custody.⁶³

Checking potential acquisitions against databases sounds more helpful than it is in practice. The International Council of Museums (ICOM) maintains a “Red List” identifying categories of objects at risk,⁶⁴ and Interpol maintains a list of objects said to be stolen or illegally excavated.⁶⁵ The Art Loss Register maintains what it describes as “the world’s largest private database of lost, stolen and looted art, antiques and collectibles. . . .”⁶⁶ Various universities, law schools, nonprofits, and web sites episodically try to assemble lists of potentially problematic objects. But none of these efforts has created a completely reliable, comprehensive, up-to-date source of information. As a result, these databases, even to the extent that one is aware of them, are of limited utility.

Another potential source of information is direct contact with the country of origin, if known, or the country of modern discovery, if different from the country of origin. An inquiry addressed to the culture ministry of a country that might possibly assert ownership of an object has superficial appeal: if the country possesses any evidence that the object was stolen or illegally excavated, they can simply say so and save all parties (other than the current possessor) from future headaches. Yet it rarely works. Governments are ill-equipped to offer advisory opinions on the legitimacy of particular objects, and even the most hard-working, knowledgeable bureaucrats have little incentive to warn (or reassure) foreign collectors or institutions about potential pitfalls. At best, any such inquiry is likely to produce a neutral response that the ministry cannot confirm whether an object is problematic.

Reasonable people can differ about the probative value of evidence discovered during provenance research. A few years ago, a U.S. museum was offered an opportunity to acquire a significant Roman statue. The country of origin was unknown, as was the location and date of modern discovery. The seller offered as evidence that the work was documented before 1970 a faxed photocopy of a letter stating that the writer had seen the object in a home in Switzerland in or around 1969. Concluding that the letter lacked probative value, the museum declined to proceed with the acquisition; another institution, applying similar policy criteria, later acquired the work.

Judgment, tempered by good faith, is imperative. The point of provenance research in the context of acquisitions, and the purpose of rigorous acquisition standards, is to ensure that museums act responsibly as members of a global community that values objects both as works of art and as part of the archaeological record. It is not enough to establish a plausible narrative for an object’s provenance to justify its acquisition. The goal must be to take seriously a shared responsibility to act in good faith, based on verifiable documentary information or on reasonable inferences drawn from the facts and circumstances of a particular situation.

In this regard, meticulous provenance research is invaluable. Curators define the importance of an object for a collection. Lawyers weigh evidence and determine whether legal and policy standards have been met. As fiduciaries, trustees ensure that a museum’s educational purposes are furthered by each acquisition and must balance the benefit of continued acquisitions against the legal and reputational risks of poor judgment. Good researchers know where to find information and discover relevant facts, circumstances, and relationships that can guide museum professionals and counsel in forming legal conclusions. Scholarship, judgment, and dogged persistence are irreplaceable contributions of provenance research.

Finally, it must be emphasized that provenance research is rarely complete. To the extent possible given institutional resources, provenance research should not end when an antiquity has been accessioned. Ongoing research adds to understanding of the work and can help address legal or ethical issues arising from later-acquired knowledge. Willingness to learn and act on new information is essential and hinges on the skills, diligence, and tireless work of provenance research.